Abstract. We investigate a first-order conditional probability logic with equality, which is, up to our knowledge, the first treatise of such logic. The logic, denoted LFPOIC = , allows making statements such as: CP s (φ, θ), and CP s (φ, θ), with the intended meaning that the conditional probability of φ given θ is at least (at most) s. The corresponding syntax, semantic, and axiomatic system are introduced, and Extended completeness theorem is proven.
Syntax and semantics
The recent papers [1, 3, 6] , discuss conditional probability extensions of classic propositional logic, while [2] introduces a first-order conditional probability logic in which iterations of conditional probability operators are not allowed. In this paper, we abandon that restriction and also extend logical language by adding equality, which causes changes in the corresponding syntax and semantics. Solving those issues is the main novelty presented in this paper.
Let [0, 1] Q denote the set of all rational numbers from the interval [0, 1]. The language L of the LFOICP = -logic consists of countable sets of variables V ar = {x 1 , x 2 , . . .}, relation symbols R m i , the relation symbol = which is, of course, interpreted rigidly as equality, and function symbols F n j , where m and n are arities of these symbols, logical connectives ∧ and ¬, the quantifier ∀, and binary conditional probability operators CP s and CP t for all s ∈ [0, 1] Q , t ∈ [0, 1) Q . Constants are function symbols whose arity is 0.
Terms and atomic formulas are defined as in the first-order classical logic with equality. The set of formulas For FOICP = is the smallest set containing atomic formulas and closed under the following formation rules: if φ and θ are formulas, then ¬φ, CP s (φ, θ), CP t (φ, θ), φ∧θ and (∀x)φ are formulas. We use the standard abbreviations for other connectives, while P s (φ) denotes CP s (φ, ⊤). A formula ψ is a sentence if no variable is free in ψ. The subset of all sentences is denoted by Sent FOICP = . We call a set T ⊂ For FOICP = a theory if T contains only sentences.
Semantics to the set of LFOICP = -formulas is given in the possible-world style. The fact that φ ∈ For FOICP = holds in a world w of some LFOICP = -model M for a valuation v of variables is denoted as (M, w, v) φ and the notation u, v) φ} is used throughout the paper.
, Prob be an LFOICP = -model and v be a valuation. The satisfiability of φ ∈ For FOICP in w ∈ W for a given valuation v is defined as follows:
− if φ is a classical first-order atomic formula, then (M, w, v) φ if and only if w φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ), where a i , i = 1, . . . , n, are the names for a i = v(w)(x i ), and w is considered as a classical first-order model, 
We say that a formula φ holds in a world w of an LFOICP = -model M and denote it by (M, w) φ if for every valuation v, (M, w, v) φ.
Since the satisfiability of a sentence φ in w does not depend on the given valuation v, and for all valuations sets [φ] By the above definition the conditional probability of φ given ψ is 1 when µ(w) ([ψ] v w ) = 0 and we have expanded Kolmogorov's definition of the conditional probability in a rather usual way following [6] and [7] . We focus on the class of models satisfying the requirement that for every φ ∈ Sent FOICP = and every w from a model M , [φ] w is a measurable set, i.e., [φ] w ∈ H(w), and that class will be denoted by LFOICP 
for the formula τ based on the sequence (θ i ) i<ω of formulas is defined by recursion:
Axioms
The axiomatic system Ax LFOICP for LFOICP contains the following axiom schemata:
Axiom 1 all the axioms of the classical propositional logic,
, where x is not a free variable in φ and φ, ψ ∈ For FOICP , Axiom 3 ∀xφ(x) → φ(t), where φ(t) is obtained by substitution of all free occurrences of x in the first-order formula φ(x) by the term t which is free for Rule 1 modus ponens,
Let us discuss the system Ax LFOICP . The axioms 1-5 and the rules 1 and 2 correspond to the classical first-order reasoning, while the axioms 6-14 concern the probabilistic part of our system. Axiom 6 announces the nonnegativity and Axioms 7 and 8 the monotonicity of the conditional probability. Axiom 9 claims that CP s (φ, θ) and CP 1−s (¬φ, θ) are equivalent if the condition has a positive probability. Axioms 10 and 11 correspond to the finite additivity of measures, while Axioms 12-14 describe the relationship between the conditional and absolute probability. Rule 3 is a form of modal necessitation. Rules 4 and 5 are the generalization of the infinitary rules which correspond to the Archimedean rule for real numbers, and do not occur in the previous papers.
Definition 2.1. φ ∈ For FOICP is a theorem, which we denote by ⊢ φ, if there exists a denumerable sequence of formulas φ 0 , φ 1 , . . . , φ called the proof, such that each member of the sequence is an instance of some axiom schemata or is obtained from the previous formulas using an inference rule.
φ is deducible from a set of sentences T (T ⊢ φ) if there is an at most countable sequence of formulas φ 0 , φ 1 , . . . , φ called the proof, such that each member of the sequence is an instance of some axiom schemata, or is contained in T or is obtained from the previous formulas using an inference rule, with the exception that the inference rule 3 can be applied to the theorems only. Definition 2.2. A theory T is consistent if there is at least one formula from For FOICP which can not be deduced from T . A theory T is maximal consistent if it is consistent and for each φ ∈ Sent FOICP , either φ ∈ T or ¬φ ∈ T .
The set of all formulas which are deducible from T is called the deductive closure of T and denoted by Cn(T ). A theory T is deductively closed if T = Cn(T ).
Soundness and completeness
Some of the following results can be proved in the way analogous to ones presented in [4, 6, 7] , so we emphasize only the main differences and new ideas. 
We conclude (M 1 , w 1 , v 1 )
, and for each n 1 s
, and the initial supposition leads to contradiction.
Theorem 3.2 (Deduction theorem). If T is a theory and φ, ψ ∈ Sent FOICP = , then T ∪ {φ} ⊢ ψ if and only if
T ⊢ φ → ψ.
The proof of Deduction theorem for LFOICP
= differs from the proof of the corresponding theorem presented in [4, 6, 7] in the case when infinitary rules are applied. If σ = Φ k (CP s (ψ, χ), (θ i ) i<ω ) is obtained from T ∪ {φ} using rule R4, then:
s , by the induction hypothesis and using an instance of the classical propositional
, by the application of the rule R4 on 2
The next corollary follows from several applications of the previous theorem, and makes more evident the necessity of imposing rigidness of terms.
Proof. We deduce as follows:
, is obtained from 1) using A3 and Deduction theorem, and an instance of a propositional tautology (p → (q → r)) ↔ (q → (p → r)), 4) ⊢ P 1 (x = x), using A4, A3, Deduction theorem and R3, 5) ⊢ x = y → P 1 (x = y), from 4) and 3) using Modus ponens.
Proof. As an illustration we prove d), while the other statements are left to the reader. We deduce as follows:
1) ⊢ P 1 (φ 1 → (φ 1 ∨ φ 2 )), applying Rule 3 to an instance of a propositional tautology , φ 2 ) ), by c) of this lemma, 3) P 1 (φ 1 ) ⊢ P 1 (φ 1 ∨ φ 2 ), from 1) and 2) using R1 and Deduction theorem, 4) ⊢ P 1 (φ 1 ) ↔ P 0 (¬φ 1 ), an instance of A9, 5) ⊢ P <s (¬φ 1 ) → P <s (¬φ 1 ∧ φ 2 ), using similar arguments as above and contraposition, 6) P 0 (¬φ 1 ) ⊢ P < 1 n (¬φ 1 ), for every n > 0, by A8, 7) P 0 (¬φ 1 ) ⊢ P 1 n (¬φ 1 ∧ φ 2 ), for every n > 0, from 5) and 6), and by A7,
and contraposition, 10) ⊢ P 1 (φ 2 ) → P 1 ((¬φ 1 ∧ φ 2 ) ∨ (φ 1 ∧ φ 2 )), using the previous clause of this lemma 11)
, from 9) and 10), 12) P 1 (φ 1 ) ⊢ P 0 (¬φ 1 ∧ φ 2 ), from 4) and 8), 13) P 1 (φ 1 ), P 1 (φ 2 ) ⊢ P 1 (φ 1 ∧ φ 2 ), from 11) and 12).
Lemma 3.2. Let T be a consistent theory. Then:
a) for every formula φ ∈ For FOICP , either T ∪ {φ} or T ∪ {¬φ} is consistent;
Definition 3.1. A set T of formulas is saturated if for each formula of the form ¬(∀x)φ(x) which is contained in T there exists a term t such that ¬φ(t) ∈ T .
In order to prove the completeness theorem, the following theorem that states that every consistent theory T can be extended to a saturated maximal consistent theory T * in some broader language is needed.
Theorem 3.3. Let T be a consistent set of sentences in the first-order probability language L, and C a countably infinite set of new constant symbols. Then T can be extended to a saturated maximal consistent theory
Proof. Let φ 0 , φ 1 , . . ., be an enumeration of all sentences in L * . We define a sequence of theories T i , i ∈ ω as follows:
is obtained by adding a formula of the form ¬(∀x)ψ(x) to the set T i , then for some c ∈ C which does not occur in any of the formulas φ 0 , . . . , φ i , we add ¬ψ(c) to
T * has required properties.
The next corollary summarizes some obvious properties of saturated maximal consistent theories.
every saturated maximal consistent theory is deductively closed;
Definition 3.2. A cut theory P − T corresponding to a theory T in the language L is the set of sentences P
Proof. We use the transfinite induction on the length of the proof for ψ from P − T . If the proof is finite ψ 1 , . . . , ψ l , ψ and T ⊢ P 1 (ψ i ) for each i = 1, . . . , l, then:
, from 2) and 3) using R1 and Deduction theorem 5)
We consider the case when the proof is infinite ψ 1 , . . . , ψ. Suppose that some ψ j is of the form Φ k (CP s (ψ, χ), (θ i ) i<ω ), and is obtained by an application of infinitary rule R4 to formulas
s , which occur in the proof sequence before ψ j . Thus, by the induction hypothesis, we have that
s , and since (⊤ → p) ↔ p is a tautology, using R4, we conclude T ⊢ P 1 (ψ).
The canonical model M for a consistent theory T is defined as follows. From the set T of all maximal saturated extensions in the expanded language L * we pick one which is a extension of T , denote it by T 1 , and set that the world w 1 is T 1 . Note that P − T1 is a consistent theory, since ⊤, P 1 (⊤), P 1 (⊤) ↔ P 0 (⊥) are contained in every maximal theory, T 1 included, and P − T1 ⊢ ⊥ would imply T 1 ⊢ P 1 (⊥) contradicting consistency of T 1 . The corresponding probability space Prob(w 1 ) is determined with
For each element from W (w 1 ) we proceed with this procedure and so on. Let C be the set of all constants from L * . The relation ∼ on C is defined by c i ∼ c j iff 
I(w)(R
. . , c m ) ∈ w}. Corollary 1 guarantees that terms are rigidly interpreted, cause ([ψ] w ). For every u ∈ W (w), if φ ∈ u then ψ ∈ u, and since u is a maximal theory, it means that φ → ψ ∈ u. Thus, P − w ∪ {¬(φ → ψ)} is not a consistent theory, and according to Deduction theorem P − w ⊢ φ → ψ. Using Lemma 3.3 we obtain w ⊢ P 1 (φ → ψ), and by Lemma 3.1c) and Deduction theorem w ⊢ P s (φ) → P s (ψ). We summarize these facts in two following lemmas: [5] it is possible to obtain finitely additive measures on the power set of W whose restrictions are µ(w) from the weak canonical model M .
